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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U-2 PROGRAM

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ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE U-2 PROGRAM

Before the beginning of the U-2 program, the United States had organized against the threat of surprise attack by the Soviet Union every one of the measures in the classical intelligence bag of tricks. U.S. sources and analyses had given us a great deal of knowledge concerning the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union.

Classical intelligence sources, however, often deal in information that is hard to verify and difficult to interpret. They showed that the Soviet Union was developing a considerable power. There remained many uncertainties concerning the level the Soviets had reached, the rate at which they were increasing their power, and their ultimate aims for its use.

The half knowledge of the Soviet Union and uncertainty of its true power position posed tremendous problems for the United States. We were faced with the constant risk of exposing ourselves to enemy attack or of needlessly expending a great deal of money and effort on military preparations of our own which would become obsolete before they were needed.


To meet this situation, we determined to embark on the U-2 program to give the U.S. a firm foundation of hard information on which to make our intelligence judgments. The program has covered a large part of the most important areas in the Soviet Union and has provided information on a great variety of subjects important to our evaluation of the Soviet power position. Our main emphasis, however, was directed against three critical problems; namely, the Soviet bomber force, the Soviet atomic energy program, and the Soviet missile program.

INTELLIGENCE OF SOVIET OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES AGAINST THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES

Between 1956 and 1960 the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union and bloc countries provided us with the following intelligence data:

1. That the Soviet bomber force was the main offensive force of the Soviet Union.
2. That only a minimum long-range bomber production program continued in the Soviet Union.

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3. That many of the Soviet bomber plants had been converted to the production of transport aircraft and in some instances to missile-associated equipment.

4. We confirmed our estimate of the disposition of Soviet long-range bombers and acquired data on the nuclear weapons storage facilities associated with them.

5. We obtained our first detailed inspection of the actual ground facilities involved in the Soviet missile test program. We were able to determine that the Soviets rely upon rail transportation as the major means of logistic support for their missile operations. Spurs from the Trans-Siberian Railroad actually run to each missile launch pad.

6. We were able to determine that the Soviet ICBM program was not a "crash" program; instead, that it was an orderly, well-planned high priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability.

7. Photography showed that the Soviets dovetail their development of operational equipment and troop training directly into their research and development program.

8. The photography derived from missions over the Soviet Union provided considerable information on the Soviet production of fissionable materials, weapons development and test activities, and the location, type, and size of stock-pile sites.

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13. The program provided us with a large amount of information on ground, naval, and air installations and order of battle. It was particularly useful in confirming naval order of battle in the Murmansk and Black Sea areas.

14. In general, the U-2 program over the Soviet Union and satellite countries tended to confirm our estimate of the size, nature, and rate of growth of Soviet industry.

ELECTRICAL DEFENSE AND RADAR ORDER OF BATTLE

On nearly all of the overflights of the Soviet Union, the U-2 aircraft carried special electronic intercept and recording equipment. The purpose of this equipment was to determine the technical characteristics and locations of Soviet radars and other electronic emissions associated with the Soviet air defense system. The electronic intercepts recorded by the U-2 aircraft on these missions permitted us to establish the basic concept, magnitude, operational efficiency, and rate of development of the Soviet air defense system between 1956 and 1960. This, in turn, provided valuable information for the planning of flight routes by U.S. strike forces.

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

The U-2 program obtained photography on over a hundred fighter airfields. This photography permitted us to determine the concept employed by the Soviets in their use of fighters as an air defense weapon. More important, however, the program permitted us to observe these fighters in an active air defense capacity. We were able to relate this information to our electronic intercepts of the early warning radar and obtained some idea of the reaction time and efficiency of the Soviet fighter defense system.

SURFACE-TO-AIR DEFENSES

The data revealed by the U-2 program not only confirmed previous estimates that the Soviets were placing very high priority on their air defense missile program, but also provided positive evidence of the program achieved. The information on the Soviet air defense system, particularly that concerning SAMs, had a direct bearing on SAC's war planning. It was the discovery of the second generation SAM system that caused SAC to increase greatly their emphasis on low level penetration tactics.

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EVIDENCE OF BASIC SOVIET INTENTIONS

During the period of the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, the intelligence derived from the photography obtained on these missions gave the U.S. increased confidence in our judgments concerning the issue of peace or war in crisis situations. Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether the situation might be beyond control--that someone on the other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war. 25X1




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
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U-2 RECONNAISSANCE SINCE MAY 1960

Since May of 1960 the U-2 has been employed in other areas of the world, particularly where the U.S. is engaged in or deeply concerned over the political future and welfare of any ally. Fifty-four missions have been flown over Laos and North Vietnam mainly in support of the U.S. operations in South Vietnam. The locations and status of unfriendly forces have been observed on a periodic basis. The road communications networks developed in Laos and North Vietnam were discovered to actually tie in to similar new networks along the South China border. The interest of the Intelligence Community in this area is still high and periodic reconnaissance of these areas will have to continue if we want to maintain our knowledge of communist actions in this area.

In 1961 the turmoil in Cuba followed by Soviet military support with equipment and weapons necessitated U-2 coverage to keep the Cuban posture under surveillance. The record of photography taken over Cuba in conjunction with certain Soviet shipping activities account for the suspicion of the Director of Central Intelligence that the Soviets were possibly moving offensive missiles into Cuba. The U-2 coverage of 14 October 1962 confirmed the existence of such missiles in Cuba and resulted in the direct action of the President. Surveillance of Cuba almost on a day-by-day basis since then by SAC U-2's is designed to thwart any such attempt by the Soviets or Cubans in the future.

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Ike Says U-2 Publicity Was Surprise to Him

NEW YORK, Nov. 3 (AP) it, then you are not a very alert President. So what are you going to do about it?

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower indicated today he was surprised at the publicity that grew out of the downed U2 spy plane inside Russia in 1960.

Eisenhower, in a National Broadcasting Co. filmed television interview on the "Sunday" program, said he shared this feeling with his Secretary of State, the late John Foster Dulles.

"He believed just as I did," said Eisenhower, "that it was necessary to use it (the U2), but he also believed that it would cause no real publicity if one of them should fall."

Eisenhower, who aired these views during a discussion of his new book, "The White House Years, Mandate for Change 1953-56," said he and Dulles felt the Soviet Union would never admit that for "three or four years we've been doing this . . ."

On a question dealing with Eisenhower's admission that the Administration was responsible for the high-altitude spy flight, the former President said he felt he had no choice.

" . . . Who is the man you are going to crucify and put up to public scorn . . ." Eisenhower said, adding:

"And secondly, if you just deny any responsibility for this kind of thing, meaning that you know nothing about

"And I just thought as long as the thing came out, the best thing to do—and I don't believe I asked anyone's advice on this—I just said, 'I am responsible and that's that.'"